514ec6cdcc
Fixed confirmed findings before public exposure: HIGH: - upload filename path traversal → store.safe_name() strips to basename - login rate-limit XFF bypass → key on request.client.host + per-username bucket; auth.check_login() burns bcrypt time on unknown users (no enumeration) - cross-user read access → per-user isolation: guests see/use/download/delete only their own assets & jobs (owner sees all); WS job events scoped per-user MEDIUM: - unbounded upload read → bounded chunked streaming to the 1GB cap - asset member path check → Path.is_relative_to boundary + ownership gate - WS token-in-query-string leak → session-cookie-only WS auth LOW: - retry_job bypassed the per-user job cap → cap now checked on retry - wholesale API-key injection → env_for_operator injects a paid key only to operators that declare it (guest local jobs never receive fal/OpenRouter keys) - session revocation → users.session_epoch, bumped on password change - int() 500s → 400; net-lane defense-in-depth (guests blocked by requires_env AND resources==net, so a mis-tagged paid op is still blocked) + public /api/health for serve.sh & proxy; docs/VPS.md; mb MB_TOKEN bearer auth tests/smoke.sh: 34 checks passing incl. all new hardening. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| smoke.sh | ||